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I.

INTRODUCTION

New Jersey's system of hospital rate setting' is a unique
response to a common set of health care problems faced by
many states. Such problems include the growing number of
uninsured, explosive health care cost increases, and an organizational structure that delivers health care services in mutliple
and overlapping settings. States have responded to these
problems in different ways, 2 but New Jersey was one of the
few states to attempt to create a state-operated system of rate
regulation that encompasses all payers3 and all hospitals while
assuring that these hospitals receive reimbursement for all
uncompensated care 4 they render. This unique system evolved
t Dr. Siegel is the Executive Director of the New Jersey Office of Health Policy
and Research and, in that capacity, will oversee the creation and implementation of
the New Jersey State Health Plan. He is a fellow of the New Jersey Academy of
Medicine.
t Ms. Weiss is the Director of Hospital Reimbursement for the New Jersey
Department of Health.
tit Ms. Lynch is the Chief of Staff for the New Jersey Department of Health.
* Any opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and are not to be
construed as the views of the New Jersey Department of Health or any other official
agency.
1. Hospital rate setting generally refers to a statutory or regulatory system that
sets the rates hospitals can charge some or all patients. Typically, the legislature
grants significant regulatory authority to a state agency. Hospital rate setting is
perhaps most closely related to public utility regulation.
2. One common approach taken by many states in the last two decades is to
regulate the rates charged by, or the costs incurred by, hospitals. More recently, a
number of states have experimented with approaches to extend health care coverage
to the uninsured, such as subsidizing low-cost insurance or developing insurance
mechanisms that "pool" the higher health risk facing some individuals.
3. A "payer" is a Blue Cross plan, insurance company, employer plan, government
program, or any other entity paying for health care services. The term includes
patients responsible for their own bills.
4. "Uncompensated care" refers to charges for which hospitals are not reimbursed
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slowly over several decades, becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex as it was transformed from a voluntary process covering only a few payers to a mandatory form of
regulation with far-reaching effects. In time, the New Jersey
system would also serve as an experiment in a radically different form of reimbursement, one which would later be adopted
by the nation's largest insurer, the Medicare program.5
Despite its growth, this is by no means a story of the system's success. It is a story of a system which may have briefly
achieved its goals in the mid-1980's, but which is now under the
extreme pressure of medical indigency, cost inflation, and, perhaps most important, the end of federal participation.
This Article reviews the history of hospital rate setting in
New Jersey, emphasizing the system's evolution in response to
newly perceived problems and changing political forces. The
system experienced some early success in controlling cost
growth and demonstrating new techniques of hospital rate setting. In later years, rate setting in New Jersey has been less
successful at confronting a new federal role and the growing
problem of health care access. The problems faced by New
Jersey hold lessons for both the federal government as it pursues cost containment and the other states who either operate
rate regulation systems or contemplate them for the future.

II. EARLY HISTORY
The origins of New Jersey hospital rate setting reach back
to 1938, when, under the Blue Cross enabling legislation, the
legislature gave the State Commissioner of Insurance and
Banking the ability to review and regulate Blue Cross premiums and hospital payments. In 1962, the Commissioner estab6
lished the first cap on payments to hospitals, a per diem limit
of fifty-six dollars.' Most hospitals were able to tolerate that
ceiling. Because the ceiling applied only to Blue Cross charges,
by the patient or a third party. Two major types of uncompensated care often
distinguished are "charity care" (the patient lacks sufficient resources to pay) and "bad
debt" (sufficient resources or third party coverage are known to exist, but no payment
is made). Usually an attempt must be made to collect amounts due before they can be
classified as bad debt. This may be accomplished by referral to a collection agency.
5. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983)
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1990)).
6. A per diem limit is a limit on daily charges to patients, including room and
board, nursing, lab tests, and other services.
7. Morone & Dunham, The Waning of Professional Dominance: DRGs and the
Hospitals,3 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring 1984, at 73.
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hospitals could shift any excess costs to other paying patients.
Thus, few of the state's hospitals found it necessary to negotiate rates above the limit, which entailed entering into an
essentially pro forma process in which the hospital and Blue
Cross went before a New Jersey Hospital Association (NJHA)8
committee, negotiated a rate, and made a recommendation to
the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking. The Commissioner, in turn, would virtually always accept the negotiated
result.9 While rate setting of some sort continued, it was
neither contentious nor adversarial. Rather, it was a simple
system based on self-regulation which received little, if any,
public scrutiny.
This system was not a permanent solution. By 1968, medical inflation pushed costs for most hospitals in New Jersey
over the fifty-six dollar per diem limit. In addition, what had
been a cordial and brief negotiation had turned into a much
more lengthy operation. One of the hospitals' main complaints, one which would be heard again and again over the
next 20-odd years, was that the system had become "retrospective." That is, reviews of hospital per diem rates were occurring after the close of the fiscal year, so that the amount of
revenue to which hospitals were entitled was not known until
after the relevant year. Hospitals underscored the cash flow
difficulties this caused when they were forced to pay vendors
and borrow from banks with no clear idea of how much
income they would eventually earn. Furthermore, there was
an increasing backlog of hospital rate reviews.
Most significantly, inner-city hospitals complained of the
lack of "case-mix adjustment," meaning that charges did not
reflect the types of patients a hospital treated. Inner-city and
teaching hospitals believed that they treated more complex,
resource-intense cases but were subject to the same ceilings
and negotiations as other hospitals. Meanwhile, they had a
smaller paying patient population to whom the unpaid costs of
regulated Blue Cross patients or indigent cases could be
shifted.
After two decades, certain themes emerged which would
be repeated in later years: the effect of rate setting when only
8. The NJHA is a private industry association that represents most of the state's
general hospitals and is extremely active in all hospital payment issues.
9. A. DUNHAM & J. MORONE, DRG EVALUATION, VOLUME IV-A: THE POLITICS OF
INNOVATION (HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST OF NEW JERSEY pub. 1983)
[hereinafter DRG EVALUATION].
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some payers are affected; the lack of timely rate setting decisions; calls for more refined methods of regulation to meet the
needs of certain hospitals; and the evolving relationships
among the regulators, hospitals, and payers. The first of these
issues to surface was the balance of power between regulators
and the industry. The other issues were left unresolved.
In the late 1960's, several events set the stage for more
stringent government intervention. Blue Cross of New Jersey
reported an operating deficit of thirteen million dollars in 1969
and began to seek tighter control over hospital capital expenditures"° through a bolstered health planning process." Hospitals accepted health planning as a way to keep out-of-state
health providers from gaining any franchises in New Jersey.
The hospitals reasoned that health planners were unlikely to
allow major new investments in the state if there was already
a generally adequate supply of health care services. Thus, both
Blue Cross and the New Jersey Hospital Association lobbied
for Certificate of Need legislation. The push for reform failed,
however, over Blue Cross's concomitant demand for statesponsored hospital budget review, which was something adamantly opposed by hospitals.
However, in the interim, a curious thing happened. NJHA
helped to reform the old retrospective budget review process in
response to payer concerns, enhancing the review process's
potential for cost control. In 1968, it proposed and helped to
implement a nonbinding, prospective peer review of hospital
per diem rates. The Health Research and Education Trust
(HRET)' 2 of New Jersey conducted the review. The new system's prospectivity was an important development because it
implied that hospitals would be required to live within a fixed
and predetermined budget. If costs were poorly managed,
there would be no automatic revenue increase to offset losses.
However, the reviews were not truly prospective; a hospital
could still come back for more. Nevertheless, NJHA had
implemented the first prospective payment system in New
10. Capital expenditures include such expenses as buildings, land, and major
equipment, as opposed to operating expenses such as salaries, food, and supplies.
11. The health planning process consisted of administrative regulation, backed by
state and federal laws limiting availability of public funds to institutions given
government approval (a "certificate of need") for new capital investments. Health
planners authorize these investments if consistent with projected need, thus protecting
against the unnecessary use of health care services simply to finance uncontrolled
expansion.
12. The HRET is the research and educational arm of NJHA.
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Jersey, no matter how piecemeal and primitive it might seem
today.
III.

THE HEALTH CARE FACILITIES PLANNING ACT OF 1971

In 1971, a number of factors led to passage of the seminal
New Jersey Health Care Facilities Planning Act.'" Blue Cross
was searching for more effective ways to control health costs
in an atmosphere of public anxiety over medical inflation.
Hospitals were seeking to strengthen their franchise rights by
excluding new competitors from the state. The 1971 Act established both mandatory certificate of need health planning and
hospital rate setting, following the example of New York,
which had begun the first mandatory state rate regulation system one year earlier. 1 4 The Act placed the certificate of need
program within the Department of Health and placed the
power to regulate Blue Cross and Medicaid hospital payment
rates with the Commissioner of Health as well.
This expanded governmental regulatory power was not a
victory by Blue Cross or government over hospitals. By creating a mandatory planning procedure, the new law forced any
entity wishing to compete with New Jersey's existing hospitals
to document the need for expansion in the certificate of need
process. The role of existing providers was strengthened, for
example, by giving specific hospitals exclusive rights to start
new services. The anticompetitiveness of the new law greatly
benefitted hospitals.
Although the 1971 Act transferred budget review authority from HRET to the Department of Health, HRET continued
to review hospital budgets. This came to an end after the 1974
publication of BureaucraticMalpractice by a New Jersey public interest group. 5 Attacking the continued self-regulation of
the hospital industry, despite the 1971 Health Care Facilities
Planning Act, the report described how there had been
"almost total erasure of a forward looking law that might have
brought great public benefits."' 6 Newly-elected Governor
13. Health Care Facilities Planning Act, 1971 N.J. LAws, ch. 136, codified as
amended at N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 26:2H-1 through 2H-26 (1990).
14. Rosko, The Impact of Prospective Payment A MultidimensionalAnalysis of
New Jersey's SHARE Program,9 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW 81 (1984).
15. R. POWELL, BUREAUCRATIC MALPRACTICE (1974) (this report was published by
the Center for the Analysis of Public Issues).
16. Id.
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Brendan Byrne and his Commissioner of Health, Joanne Finley, seized upon the report.
As a result of the external pressure, the Department of
Health began to implement a rate regulation system as
required by the 1971 Act. In 1975, the Department proposed an
effective 2.5 percent rate increase, far below the double-digit
rate increases that had been common before. 7 Several hospital lawsuits ensued, and these lawsuits, coupled with a Byrne
administration weakened over a battle to introduce an income
tax, eventually caused an average 12.5 percent rate increase for
hospitals.
IV.

SHARE:

HARBINGER OF THE FUTURE

Nevertheless, change continued as the Standard Hospital
Accounting and Rate Evaluation System (SHARE), a much
more complex rate setting mechanism designed under the
Department of Health's auspices, was put into place in 1976.
SHARE consisted of a review by the Department of Health of
costs by cost center 8 for hospitals which raised their rates over
three percent. Rates were regulated only for Blue Cross and
Medicaid. The two most striking features of SHARE were its
complexity and its administrative intensity.
First, the genteel negotiation over rates by state and hospital analysts in front of NJHA or HRET was replaced by complicated cost accounting with government accountants and
hearing officers.' 9 Second, SHARE quickly became a lengthy
process with numerous hospital administrative appeals. By
1978, the program had a one-year backlog of appeals. In 1979,
there would be appeals dating back to 1975 still not heard.
One-third of New Jersey's hospitals had not been issued their
1978 rates by May 1979.20
Once again, certain themes emerged. New Jersey was
using an ever more complex and refined rate setting methodology to control costs. SHARE featured a more interventionist
government role than did the systems of the 1950s and 1960s,
but it produced the same backlogs. Under SHARE, however,
17. Morone & Dunham, Slouching Toward National Health Insurance: The
UnanticipatedPolitics of DRGs, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 646 (1986).
18. A cost center is a commonly defined area of hospital costs used for accounting
purposes; examples are laboratory tests, radiology exams, and dietary (patient food).
19. Rosko, supra note 14.
20. DRG EVALUATION, supra note 9.
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the issues of partial payer participation became more visible
and a new problem emerged-uncompensated care. Three
groups pressed for further regulatory change: urban hospitals,
commercial payers, and government officials.
SHARE made no explicit provision for bad debt and charity care.21 An inner-city hospital with a large indigent patient
load was forced to make up any deficit due to care of those
who could not pay by raising rates on other patients. But those
rates could not be raised for SHARE-regulated payers-Blue
Cross and Medicaid-leaving few patients to absorb the shift.
By forcing and yet preventing such cost-shifting, SHARE
placed urban hospitals in a double bind and demonstrated the
problems inherent in regulating only some classes of payers.
Commercial payers also objected to SHARE, because they
resented its de facto Blue Cross and Medicaid rate discount.
As an effect of regulating rates for only these two payers, it
was estimated that the two regulated payers were essentially
receiving a 30 percent markdown on their payments.22 This
indicated that a more inclusive system was needed, one which
would allow some sort of "equity" among payers.
The third pressure for further change, which echoed historical developments, was the interest of government officials
in refining the rate setting methodology. Commissioner Finley
was eager to experiment with a case-mix (sensitive per case)
payment system which she believed could change the incentives inherent in a per diem reimbursement system. Per diem
payment was unfair because it paid every hospital the same
daily amount without regard to the type of patient treated and
because it encouraged overuse of services since each additional
day of hospital stay generated revenue for the hospital.
In contrast, an adjustment for case mix helped hospitals
treating sicker patients, and per case payments encouraged
hospitals to manage each patient's care more efficiently
because no additional revenue would be forthcoming for each
additional day of hospital stay. Finley had become familiar
with the possibilities of per case reimbursement while on the
faculty at Yale University, where a group of researchers had
been developing a patient classification system known as Diagnosis Related Groups or DRGs.2 s Such a system would be pro21. Id.
22. Id.
23. DRGs

are

clusters

of cases

within

the same

diagnostic

category

(e.g.,
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spective in that the payment for a given hospitalization would
be set before, not after, the services were delivered. The federal government had also expressed interest in funding a demonstration project using a case-mix sensitive payment scheme
because it would be easier to put in place a system for controlling federal hospital care costs through Medicare if the objections of hospitals treating sicker patients were addressed.
Eager to provide such a demonstration and to bring about
some sort of "payer equity," the Department of Health helped
craft a piece of legislation, S-1454. The bill would have
extended rate setting over all payers and would have allowed a
reimbursement demonstration. It also would have forced pooling of the state's hospital endowments under state control.
With no hospital support, with Blue Cross opposition to the
perceived loss of their effective discount relative to other payers, and with Governor Brendan Byrne in deep political
trouble, the bill died in committee in 1976.'
After Governor Byrne's re-election,' S-1454 was rewritten
as S-446. Any reference to control over hospital endowments
was dropped, thus mollifying hospitals.2" Oblique language
about a case-mix reimbursement system remained but with no
mention of DRGs, which remained an abstract and esoteric
concept-'7
However, the most important change had nothing to do
with case-mix reimbursement. The legislation included an
explicit reference to the cost of uncompensated care as an
allowable "financial element."'
This change earned the support of New Jersey's struggling urban hospitals, battered by
the SHARE system and indigent case loads. Under the bill,
they could charge every patient the same amount, and that
respiratory system) that consume similar resources. Once cases are classified into
DRGs, it is relatively easy to develop an average fixed payment rate for each case,
depending on the cost of resources used to treat like cases in the DRG. DRG rates are
therefore based on case mix and are fixed per case.
24. DRG EVALUATION, supra note 9.

25. Byrne had been expected to lose re-election. The NJHA vigorously and
publicly opposed

his re-election.

May

& Wasserman, Selected Results from an

Evaluation of the New Jersey Diagnosis-RelatedGroup System, 19 HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH 547 (1984). Despite every prediction to the contrary, Byrne was returned to
office and proceeded to retain his entire cabinet.

26. DRG EVALUATION, supra note 9.
27. Act effective July 20, 1978, ch. 83, 1978 N.J. LAws, (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:48-7 (Supp. 1990) and at scattered sections of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H (Supp.
1990)).
28. Id.
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amount would include all the costs of charity care and bad debt
incurred in the operations of that institution. Recognition of
uncompensated care forced NJHA to support the bill's expansion of rate setting authority because S-446 threatened to cause
a split in the ranks of NJHA should the association try to
oppose the legislation. Urban hospitals would conceivably
oppose NJHA and might even break away to form their own
association, as they indeed threatened to do on several occasions. 9 NJHA opposition to the bill had been effectively neutralized by this change.
There were, of course, other factors that led to the eventual passage of S-446. First, the federal government, interested
in a demonstration, promised a waiver of Medicare reimbursement rules in return for the opportunity to explore the effects
of case-mix adjusted reimbursement. Thus, Medicare would
pay New Jersey hospitals under New Jersey rates, including
the "financial element" of uncompensated care, which would
represent an infusion of sixty million dollars of new money
annually.' ° However, the federal government imposed conditions on the waiver, including cost neutrality or savings to
Medicare. These conditions proved harder than expected to
meet, and only a fraction of the promised infusion ever materialized. Nevertheless, the promise of sixty million dollars was a
major inducement to hospitals and legislators when passing the
bill.
A further inducement was that S-446 vaguely assured the
"solvency" of "efficient and well-utilized" hospitals.3 ' While
no one knows to this day what those terms mean, the reference to solvency at least gives hospitals some basis for claiming
that their financial health is guaranteed by state law. Another
element of the deal over S-446 helped Blue Cross, which was
upset over its loss of its de facto discount. To compensate, Blue
Cross was allowed to extend experience rating3 2 to groups of 50
to 100 subscribers, whereas experience rating had been allowed
only for groups numbering over 100 previously.
29. Morone & Dunham, supra note 17.
30. DRG EVALUATION, supra note 9.

31. 1978 N.J. LAws, ch. 83 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-7 and at scattered
sections of N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:2H).
32. "Experience rating" means setting premiums for a group based on its record of
health care costs and its characteristics that might affect future costs (e.g., age). The
alternative, community rating, spreads costs over a broader base and is often perceived
as fairer by consumer advocates. Payers often prefer experience rating because it
allows more competitive pricing to lower cost groups.
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S-446 passed after lengthy hearings and negotiations in
1978."s Despite the subsequent second thoughts of many legislators who had no idea that a statutory reference to "case-mix"
would be translated into dozens of pages of regulations4 creating an alien and complicated system called DRGs, the first 25
hospitals came on line in the new reimbursement system in
1980. While space does not permit a fuller explanation, let it
suffice to say that the technical problems of implementation in
the face of some industry reluctance were considerable. Implementation required the creation of hundreds of patient and
hospitalization rates at each of over 100 hospitals. This was not
a simple task. Nonetheless, by 1982, all New Jersey hospitals
were phased into the DRG system. Remarkably, while some
expected that the 1981 election of new Republican Governor
Thomas Kean would sound the death knell of government
intervention in the form of DRGs, little actually happened.
Indeed, with the urban hospital issue in mind, the NJHA
passed a resolution asking the new chief executive to continue
the experiment.3 5
The passage and implementation of S-446 pointed to several forces and trends that would have critical ramifications for
later years. The system created incentives for cost control by
setting per-case rates, prospectively based on case mix (in this
case, DRGs). Hospitals accepted rate regulation in return for
certain forms of protection, such as health planning which
kept their franchises intact. The uncompensated care issue
was important enough to possibly undermine and divide the
hospital association. The key to addressing uncompensated
care was to have all payers, including Medicare, in the same
system. If the system had one shortcoming, it was its complexity. Hospitals and payers understood the system's virtues and
accepted complexity as the price to be paid, but consumers had
a harder time doing so.
IV.

EARLY DAYS OF DRGs

From the beginning, the newly instituted DRG component
of New Jersey's system, while less critical in retrospect than
the system's recognition of uncompensated care, suffered from
33. 1978 N.J. LAWS, ch. 83 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-7 and at scattered
sections of N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:2H).
34. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8:31B, § § 2.1-5.3 (1989).
35. DRG EVALUATION, supra note 9.

1991]

Setting New Jersey Hospital Rates

poor public relations. These problems continue periodically to
this day. One typical scandal involved the "6,000 dollar broken
finger." A patient with a finger fracture would end up in the
same DRG as total hip replacements. Unfortunately, the DRG
patient classifications often lumped dissimilar patients
together. Although the diagnosis group classifications can be
refined through experience, cases in which hospitals were
overcompensated were seized upon by the public and the legislature. Indeed, such classification problems are some of the
few elements of New Jersey's complex rate setting system
which the lay person can easily understand. The inner workings of the DRG system are so difficult to explain (no one has
ever tried to do so in a comprehensive fashion publicly as far as
we can tell) that they pose a public relations problem in and of
themselves. Objections to the complexity and inaccessibility of
the system surfaced, as they would again ten years later in
another time of stress.
How did the system prevail throughout the 1980's in the
face of public misperceptions? The answer is that it met the
goals of hospitals and payers well enough and attained its own
goals sufficiently to offset criticism by the public. There is
good evidence that DRG reimbursement led to a dramatic
improvement in the financial position of virtually all New
37
36
Jersey hospitals, with urban hospitals benefitting the most.
Case-mix prospective payment brought with it a lot of cash,
especially through the newly authorized uncompensated care
element. While a few hospitals opposed the new system, some
of the largest hospitals were clearly beneficiaries. Any attempt
on the part of NJHA to replace or remove DRGs would have
been a perceived threat to the fiscal solvency of many of its
biggest members. NJHA was thus forced to keep a low profile
on the issue lest it find itself split asunder.
Despite the added cost of the uncompensated care provisions, at least one class of payers reaped an important benefit.
Commercial insurers had operated at a distinct disadvantage
under SHARE. They, in essence, paid for the alleged 30 per36. Hadley & Swartz, The Impacts on Hospital Costs Between 1980 and 1984 of
Hospital Rate Regulation, Competition, and Changes in Health Insurance Coverage, 26
INQUIRY, Spring 1989, at 35.
37. Hsiao & Dunn, The Impact of DRG Payment on New Jersey Hospitals, 24
INQUIRY, Fall 1987, at 212.
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Payer equity
cent discount of Blue Cross and Medicaid.'
under the new system was important to commercial insurers,
and commercial insurers (including Prudential, which is based
in New Jersey) were important to the state.3 9 They thus saw
the all-payer system as a major boon.
New Jersey's system became nationally known for its use
of DRGs and the incentives for hospital cost control that percase, case-mix adjusted payments were expected to have. Yet,
while the per case method of payment was important in terms
of the new incentives it created, it was not DRGs that formed
the real pressure point on the system. One can imagine many
different payment schemes, but equity among payers and the
recognition of bad debt and charity care remain as the forces
underlying the New Jersey system. Without a solution to the
problems of payers, especially an end to large scale cost-shifting between classes of payers, there could be no equitable solution to the problems of bad debt and charity care. The failure
of the all-payer coalition could, in turn, help destroy the
uncompensated care mechanism. These were the two elements
around which debate would revolve in the future.
A.

Evaluating the Effects of the System

The cost containment effects of DRG reimbursement in its
One
early years in New Jersey are difficult to quantify.'
study of Maryland and New Jersey reimbursement found that
rate regulation by itself led to a nine percent increase in total
hospital costs in 1980, no significant change in 1981-83, and
costs that were 10.9 percent lower by 1984 (all relative to 1979).
This conclusion was consonant with the finding that government rate regulation, in general, was effective on both the federal and state levels in containing hospital costs. 41 However,

another
decrease
increase
Overall,

study of the New Jersey experience found that any
in cost per case was offset by a small but measurable
in admission rates after the introduction of DRGs. 4
one could contend that hospitals reacted rationally,

38. This discount has not been conclusively documented, and the 30 percent figure
is based on the memory of former state and insurance company officials.

39. Prudential and other commercial insurers are significant employers and a
major economic force in New Jersey.
40. The statistical methodology in any such evaluation would be open to debate.
41. Hadley & Swartz, supra note 36.
42. Hsiao & Dunn, supra note 37.
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cutting their costs per case but increasing their reimbursement
by increasing the number of admissions.
The effects of DRG reimbursement on quality of care are
even less clear than the cost-containment effects of DRGs.
One study found that length of stay, daily use of radiologic procedures, and volume of radiologic procedures per patient
declined under DRG prospective reimbursement in New
Jersey, while the volume of laboratory services per day and
per case increased.4 3 The effects this has had on quality of care
are simply not known, especially when one realizes that the
"right" volume of these procedures is unknown. Patients may
have received too many tests and procedures before DRGs, and
now receive too few. Alternatively, patients may have previously received too few, and now receive too many. All hypotheses are equally plausible without a rigorous analysis of
quantifiable patient outcomes. Unfortunately, no such analysis
was undertaken in New Jersey before or after 1980, and quality of care continues to be an area of comparative neglect in
the state's prospective payment system.4 Moreover, it again
received little mention in the next era of reform ten years
after the system's inception.
B.

Problems Emerge

The years following the full enactment of the DRG system
in New Jersey saw several key developments with ominous
consequences for the future. In one sense, the experiment
slowly became a victim of its own success. The federal Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA)4 5 liked what it saw in
its New Jersey demonstration. Faced with an average yearly
Medicare hospital spending increase of 19.2 percent from 1967
through 1982, HCFA moved quickly to adopt a new Prospective Payment System (PPS) for Medicare. Congress ordered
HCFA to design a hospital payment reform in September
1982. 6 Thirteen months later, PPS was up and running.4 7
43. Broyles, Ffficiency, Costs, and Quality: The New Jersey Experience Revisited,
27 INQUIRY, Spring 1990, at 86.
44. The state has never really performed an evaluation.

45. The HCFA is the component of the federal Department of Health and Human
Services which operates Medicare and Medicaid.
46. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Title I, Pub. L. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (1982) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1990)).
47. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983)
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1990)) (which created Medicare's
Prospective Payment System for Inpatient Hospitals). Medicare's system is like New
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The adoption of PPS by Medicare set the stage for that
program's withdrawal from the New Jersey all-payer systema most significant development since Medicare accounts for
thirty-nine percent of the average New Jersey hospital's business. PPS gave the federal government the ability to adjust
hospital payments on the basis of budget constraints, an ability
it had never before possessed. Not only did the federal government gain the cost control incentives of per-case payment, but
the annual decision of how much to increase rates was left initially to the federal Executive Branch at a time of record federal deficits. The benefits now accrued to the United States
government, not to the New Jersey rate-setting system. As
PPS rates declined relative to New Jersey rates, it became
harder and harder to satisfy the cost neutrality or savings
requirements of the federal waiver. Gradually, beginning in
1986, it became necessary for a share of Medicare's payments
for uncompensated care under New Jersey's system to be
picked up by other payers." Medicare, under the waiver, had
been paying its share of the approved cost of uncompensated
care of non-Medicare patients in New Jersey, something it does
not do in other states. The all-payer system was threatened by
the explicit reintroduction of cost-shifting for the first time
since 1980, undermining the consensus that had grown up
around bad debt and charity care.
Closely linked to Medicare's withdrawal from New
Jersey's system was the problem of uncompensated care. S-446
had recognized bad debt and charity care as approved costs of
doing business. Each hospital had its rates increased enough to
recoup its own uncompensated care costs, causing the development of large rate differences among hospitals. 49 These rate
variations resulted in a major inequity among hospitals which
was exacerbated as payers (especially health maintenance
organizations) became more price conscious and began to shop
among hospitals for the best price. In 1985, some hospitals
raised their rates by as little as one percent for uncompensated
Jersey's system in most important respects. Both classify patients into DRGs and set a
fixed price for each case. The federal Medicare system does not allow payment for
uncompensated care and does not include mandatory health planning through
Certificate of Need, which was repealed by Congress just as PPS was created.
48. Interview with Nancy L. Featherstone, New Jersey Department of Health
(Jan. 7, 1991).
49. Crawford, All-Payer Financing of Uncompensated Care:

Experience, 62 BuLL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 630 (1986).

The New Jersey

1991]

Setting New Jersey Hospital Rates

care while others raised theirs by as much as twenty-five percent.' Hospitals with large indigent care loads were placed at
a competitive disadvantage because their rates had to be that
much higher. This led to their loss of insured patients as
insurers sought to have their subscribers admitted to lower
cost hospitals, eroding patient base and causing these hospitals
to further raise their uncompensated care mark-ups.
New Jersey's answer to this problem, adopted in 1986, was
the Uncompensated Care Trust Fund.5 1 Every hospital would
have the same percentage added on to its bills for uncompensated care. Those hospitals which collected more than their
costs from the add-on because of their low uncompensated care
burden would pay the excess into the Fund. Those who did
not collect enough would draw from the Fund.5 2 Thus, the
total cost of uncompensated care did not change because of the
Fund, but the collection method was altered to allow for uniform uncompensated care add-ons across the state.
The formation of the Uncompensated Care Trust Fund
had several unintended consequences. The most important
was that it made uncompensated care a much more visible and
explosive issue because its authorizing legislation included a
sunset clause, setting an expiration date for the Fund. From
then on a major element of hospital rate setting and of providing care to the indigent would be periodically debated in the
legislature, something which the structure of the original rate
setting legislation had avoided by placing most of the details in
regulation, not legislation.5" From then on, the legislature and
the public saw a single identifiable fund, financed through an
increase to each hospital bill which was in turn financed by
insurance premiums.
Other reforms and refinements to New Jersey's rate setting system were added to New Jersey regulations in 1988 and
1 9 8 9 .'

Reimbursement was made much more dependent on

hospital volume, with the intention that hospitals with declining patient loads would be slowly "squeezed out" of the system
50. Id.
51. Uncompensated Care Trust Fund Act, ch. 204, 1986 N.J. LAWS, (originally
codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-4.1 (Supp. 1990), continued by N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:2H-18.4 and § 26:2H-18.23 (Supp. 1990), expired on Dec. 31, 1990, by Act approved
Jan. 1, 1989, ch. 1, 1989 N.J. LAws § 23).
52. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8:31B, § § 7.1-7.9 (1989).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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as their revenues declined. Reimbursement of overhead costs
was also altered to reward hospitals with increasing volume.
An attempt was made at further refinement of the DRG system to recognize the severity of an individual patient's illness
and to adjust the payment rate concomitantly, but this later
foundered in the face of payer opposition, hospital division, and
the inertia of a lame duck Administration. Meanwhile, the
issues of the uninsured, of the failing all-payer system, and of
overall medical inflation remained.
V.

THE 1990'S OPEN: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW SOLUTIONS

The debate over further technical refinements to New
Jersey's DRG system in 1988 and 1989 left unresolved more
fundamental issues of cost and access which once again
emerged as a new governor took office in 1990. These issues
echoed not only the debate taking place at a national level, but
reflected the same problems which had prompted the creation
of the DRG system twelve years before: increasing health care
costs, especially for uncompensated care; the problem of financial stability of Blue Cross/Blue Shield; and the growing backlog of unresolved issues in a complex rate setting system.
Further, the emphasis of the uncompensated care debate
shifted. The focus was no longer solely on the solvency of hospitals but expanded to examine barriers to access to care for
one million uninsured New Jerseyans.
The Uncompensated Care Trust Fund might have
remained visible, though not explosive, had it not been for several concurrent trends. First, the uncompensated care price
tag has been rising rapidly, rising from 239 million dollars in
1983 to over 700 million dollars in 1990 and to a projected 912
Growth may have been due to
million dollars in 1991.'
number of factors including medical price inflation and more
uninsured individuals, but whatever the reason, it grew rapidly
as a proportion of total hospital revenue, from slightly over six
percent in 1983 to almost ten percent by the close of the decade.5 6 Here was a giant fund, growing rapidly, and under the
control of the state legislature. It made a visible target for
those both within and without government who saw the Fund
as a manifestation of unrestrained health care expense.
55. Uncompensated Care Trust Fund Calculation, New Jersey Dept. of Health
(Jan. 1, 1991) (copy on file at the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
56. Id.
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While the Fund undoubtedly achieved its goal of assuring
access and more equitably distributing the costs of uncompensated care among New Jersey hospitals, the surcharge required
to do so added approximately eighteen percent to the average
non-Medicare hospital bill in 1989.11 The Trust Fund was
growing twice as fast as the overall cost of hospital care. ss Furthermore, with the end of the waiver in 1988, Medicare no
longer paid for uncompensated care, making the effective
surcharge for participating payers even higher. In effect, half
the patients were financing the entire cost of uncompensated
care.5 9 Accordingly, the size of the Trust Fund and the use of a
surcharge on hospital bills to finance uncompensated care
became increasingly controversial issues.
By 1990, the number of uninsured New Jerseyans
approached one million.' As in the rest of the nation, several
factors contributed to the rapid growth in the number of uninsured in New Jersey, such as growth in the historically underinsured small business sector and reductions in dependent
coverage. Two-thirds of uninsured New Jerseyans were
employed or dependents of workers, and a disproportionate
number worked in small businesses. One in four were children."' Growth in the number of uninsured increased the
uncompensated care burden faced by hospitals and the two
issues became linked.
Another shortcoming of the Uncompensated Care Trust
Fund became apparent as the problems of the uninsured
received more attention on a national level. The Trust Fund
did indeed see to it that a hospital got paid for treating all its
patients, as long as the hospital made a good faith effort to collect from all patients who were deemed ineligible for charity
care. However, this was not the same as providing insurance to
the uninsured. Patients without insurance still faced collection
efforts if they were not eligible for charity care but, nonetheless, were too poor to pay a hospital bill. More profoundly,
there was no entitlement to care for uninsured individuals,
such as an insurance plan might provide.
57. GOVERNOR'S
COMM.
ON
HEALTH
CARE
COSTS, COST ACCESSIBILITY
RESPONSIBILITY EFFICIENCY FOR NEW JERSEY 4 (1990) [hereinafter CARE] (copy on file
with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
58. Uncompensated Care Trust Fund Calculation, supra note 55.
59. See CARE, supra note 57, at 42.
60. See CARE, supra note 57, at 6.
61. Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1986).
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The rising costs of health care in general, and uncompensated care in particular, had taken their toll on Blue Cross by
1990. The "Blues" market share declined markedly, and state
insurance regulators were asked to approve rate increases for
individual and small group plans, the most economically vulnerable plans, of forty-seven percent in 1990. This followed
increases of twenty-two percent in 1988 and twenty-four percent in 1989.62 Blue Cross maintained that cost increases of
this magnitude were required by the "hidden tax" on each bill
collected to finance uncompensated care.6 Because health
care in New Jersey is subject to the same cost pressures occurring nationally, the "hidden tax" argument may not have been
completely supported by the facts, but it was a politically
appealing argument.
Finally, the complexity of the state's rate setting system
had resulted in a logjam of as many as six years' unresolved
rate appeals and final reconciliations.' The system was viewed
by hospitals, payers and patients alike as burdensome and
unmanageable. What had begun as a special exceptions process
to respond to extraordinary cost increases at individual hospitals had burgeoned into as many as 2,000 annual rate appeals
filed by New Jersey's 85 general hospitals.' The state Department of Health was also swamped by complaints from patients
because the charges they saw on hospital bills were often
vastly exceeded by the mysterious "DRG" amount, including
markup factors for uncompensated care, Medicare shortfalls,
and the like. In addition, the complexity and confusion of the
system failed to yield clear benefits. New Jersey hospitals' cost
growth approached national rates, and payers faced continual
uncertainty about hospital costs because DRG rates swung
widely each month with retrospective rate adjustments.' The
more special adjustments that were made, the more uncertainty that was created for payers trying to set premiums and
for hospitals trying to close their books. Thus, the issues of the
1960s and early 1980s were re-visited as the 1990s began.
Responding to these pressures, newly elected Governor
James Florio, in April 1990, appointed a Commission on Health
62. New Jersey Blue Cross/Blue Shield testimony
Commission on Health Care Costs, June 12, 1990.
63. Id.
64. See CARE, supra note 57.
65. See CARE, supra note 57, at 6.
66. Id. at 23-26.
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Care Costs to examine the components of New Jersey's health
care system as they related to cost and access. The Commission's members held open hearings and reviewed reports from
hospitals, payers, business, and state agencies, as well as studying approaches taken by other states. Working in five task
forces, by October 1990 the Commission had formulated a
broad approach, encompassing ninety-two specific recommendations for reforming New Jersey's health care system.6 7 Most

dealt with changes in uncompensated care financing, rate setting, health planning, and Medicaid. The remainder of this
Article outlines the Commission's most significant recommendations and evaluates the chances for success and the likely
price of failure.
VI.

How TO PAY FOR THE UNINSURED

The rising costs of health care for business and the growing problem of the uninsured made the future of the Uncompensated Care Trust Fund the most urgent business of the
Commission. The "hidden tax" on hospital bills, once the
linchpin of success for New Jersey rate setting, was becoming
far too large to hide, and the Trust Fund's authorizing legislation was scheduled to expire in December 1990. It was no
longer enough to argue that the Trust Fund's growth was evidence that New Jerseyans enjoyed access to hospital care
regardless of insurance status. Nor could it be argued that the
Trust Fund merely made visible the subsidy of costs which
were recognized in other states through unregulated cost
shifting.
From the beginning, Commission members, the governor,
and key legislators remained committed to financing care for
the uninsured.' The imperatives against threatening access to
care for the uninsured and urban hospital insolvency were just
too strong. Thus, the Commission focused primarily on
reforming the financing of uncompensated care. There was
consensus that the surcharge approach was unfair to businesses that did provide health insurance, taxing them to pay
for their own employees as well as for their own (and Medicare's) share of the uninsured.6 9 Business claimed it was put at
a competitive disadvantage when compared with competitors in
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 1.
69. Id. at 45.
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other states who were not subsidizing uncompensated care.
However, others maintained that the only difference in New
Jersey was that this subsidy was visible in the Uncompensated
Care Trust Fund. Business demanded relief from a relentless
spiral: rising costs made health insurance less affordable, led
to fewer people with insurance, led to more uncompensated
care, drove up bills for the remaining insured, and made their
insurance less affordable. As noted earlier, Blue Cross blamed
massive premium increases on the surcharge method for
financing uncompensated care. Whether this is true or not, it
set the stage for Blue Cross to argue for alternate financing as
a precondition for their continued willingness to participate in
rate setting (recall that Blue Cross received larger discounts
before the all-payer system).
The Commission's deliberations also revealed doubts about
whether the continued guarantee of uncompensated care payments to hospitals was the best use of resources. The Commission noted that the Trust Fund made access to health care for
the uninsured available only in the hospital, instead of subsidizing primary and preventive care in community based settings which could be more cost-effective and improve
continuity of care.7 ° This also underscored charges that the
Uncompensated Care Trust Fund was designed to assure hospital solvency, not to guarantee people the care they need
regardless of ability to pay. Some skeptics emphasized that
over eighty percent of Trust Fund payments in 1989 covered
uncollectible bad debts, while only twenty percent went to pay
for care of individuals meeting the state's charity care guidelines.7 This characterization is somewhat unfair because a
good portion of so-called bad debt is probably attributable to
individuals who actually meet charity care guidelines. The
criticism does, however, underscore the fact that the amount of
"true" charity care is unknown.
Faced with these arguments, the Commission recommended two fundamental changes in strategy: the adoption of
a broad-based financing approach for uncompensated care and
the restructuring of the market for insurance by converting
the Trust Fund from a simple payer of bills to a true insurance
mechanism that would expand access to health insurance. To
implement its broad-based financing approach, the Commission
70. Id.
71. Id. at 49.
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endorsed abolition of the surcharge on hospital bills and the
substitution of a one percent payroll tax on the first 14,400 dollars of income coupled with "pay or play" penalties on employers of 1,000 dollars for every employee not provided with
health coverage.7 2 With the payroll tax instead of the
surcharge, Commission members argued that the costs of
health insurance to some New Jersey businesses could actually
decline.7" Under the payroll tax plan, employers who do provide insurance to their employees would pay, on average, 144
dollars in taxes to finance uncompensated care instead of 200
dollars in insurance premiums, a savings of fifty-six dollars per
employee over the "hidden tax" approach.7 4
Adoption of a broader financing mechanism would also
make possible the second feature of this strategy: reducing the
amount of uncompensated care by increasing access to health
insurance. The Trust Fund would be replaced in part by publicly sponsored health insurance plans which could offer innovative, low-cost insurance subsidized by the new payroll tax
and revenue from employer penalties. Such plans could stress
primary and preventive care, could pay for care in the most
appropriate setting, and could apply the managed care principles used with success in other states. The design of primary
and preventive care programs for children, documented as
cost-effective,75 would be a priority. This structural reform
would be coupled with other changes meant to improve access
to insurance, such as prohibiting pre-existing condition coverage exclusion, relaxing some insurance mandates and requiring
community rating for individual and small group policies.7 6
Not incidentally, this restructuring could also resolve Blue
Cross's grim financial problems. The Commission recommended splitting Blue Cross into two entities-one retaining
its stable large group business, and the other a public purpose
entity eligible for subsidies for the uninsured or underinsured
that would be required to use community rating. 77 While subsidies would be available for any insurer offering the low-cost
plans described above, this strategy at least assured that public
72. Id. at 48.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 39-40.
75. UNITED
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76. See CARE, supra note 57, at 34.
77. Id.
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revenues would be available to continue supporting Blue Cross
as "insurer of last resort" should no other plans step forward.
As 1990 drew to a close, the Commission's recommendations ran into political roadblocks as uncompensated care took
center stage in a bigger, more political arena. The payroll
tax-key to the new strategy for access to health care-faced
little chance of success in the face of taxpayer reaction to the
governor's program of income and excise tax increases adopted
earlier in the year. Key legislators refused to extend the Trust
Fund until a consensus emerged on reforming the broader system of financing health care. Governor Florio agreed that a
simple extension of the Trust Fund would be undesirable
unless coupled with other initiatives broadening access to
health care and controlling costs. As required by law, once the
Trust Fund expired on December 31, 1990, the New Jersey
Department of Health reintroduced the system of paying for
uncompensated care that had existed before the Trust Fund's
creation in 1986, under which each hospital was allowed to
mark up its bills sufficiently to collect uncompensated care
from its own paying patients. But five years later, with hospital costs much higher and Medicare no longer paying its share
of uncompensated care, there was real fear that such a system
could push hospital bills to unsustainable levels. The
surcharge for some inner city hospitals would run as high as 60
percent, and some hospitals worried aloud that their few
insured patients would be driven away, forcing insolvency. 8
Expiration of the Trust Fund in December 1990 may or
may not have forced a public health crisis. The larger question
is whether the expiration has provided the momentum necessary to move forward on a strategy for improving access to
health insurance. Adoption of a payroll tax seems next to
impossible, certainly until after the November 1991 elections.
Yet without a source of financing to replace the surcharge, the
recommendations of the Governor's Commission are far harder
to put in place.
VII.

THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE COST CONTROL

Recognizing that the largest sources of cost growth in the
1990s are not in the hospital but in outpatient diagnosis and
treatment, the Commission essentially accepted health plan78. As of April 1991, these problems remain, and the Fund has not been revived.
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ning principles that new investments should be allowed only
where an objective determination of need was made. The
Commission recommended that the need for all health facilities and services, not only hospital facilities and services, be
assessed in light of a state Health Plan with the force and
effect of state law. Such a plan would explicitly declare where
new services and facilities could be developed in New Jersey.
The current health planning statutes clearly exclude the private practice of medicine from regulation. 79 This has been a
major issue of contention for hospitals claiming that they are
forced to compete on an uneven playing field. Extending the
certificate of need process beyond hospitals to other providers
of outpatient diagnosis and treatment, including physicianowned providers, would recognize that hospital regulation
addressed a shrinking portion of the diversifying market for
health care. For example, in 1990 it was estimated that there
were perhaps eight magnetic resonance imagers in New Jersey
hospitals but over sixty in the possession of unregulated physician practices.80 The effects of regulating only part of the "pie"
were obvious. Indeed, extension of such regulation can be seen
as one way of helping to protect the hospital franchise on certain services which is increasingly threatened by the movement of new technologies to physician offices."'
It is interesting to note, however, that the Commission did
not repeat the pattern set in S-446 of regulating supply
through health planning and regulating reimbursement. The
Commission did not make recommendations to regulate reimbursement for outpatient services outside those owned by the
hospital. Nonetheless, the laudable decision to extend regulation to other settings, if only partially, must be viewed as an
extension of the traditional quid pro quo with payers asked to
subsidize uncompensated care. If health plans created for the
uninsured were to be restructured to cover non-hospital services, then payers must be assured that the cost of these services
be restrained through rigorous needs assessment. It is safe to
assume that rate regulation of providers not owned by hospi-

tals will be next.
Endorsement of the State Health Plan approach also
reflected the Commission's resolve to put new "teeth" in the
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-2(a) & (b) (1990).
80. Uncompensated Care Trust Fund Calculation, supra note 55.
81. Such protection can control costs but can also stifle innovation.
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hospital regulatory process. There was a perception in the
course of the Commission's hearings that the health planning
infrastructure served to give franchises to hospitals without
due regard to quantifiable need or cost. Under the Commission's recommendations, regulators would have powerful tools:
a plan identifying clearly where excess capacity existed and
the ability to closely monitor new hospital performance
benchmarks, which will identify high cost, inefficient, or insolvent New Jersey hospitals relative to national norms. The
notion is that regulators will use these new tools to improve
financial and utilization problems at troubled hospitals if the
capacity is truly needed, while making a clearer case for closing or merging unneeded hospitals. Once again, the Commission's recommendations will only be as good as the political
will and leadership devoted to implementing them. Closing
hospitals or denying certificates of need, for example, are often
very sensitive politically.
Another focus of the Commission's recommendations was
rate regulation of capital costs, which had traditionally been
less closely monitored than operating costs. The Commission
made its health planning recommendations at a time when
New Jersey's hospitals faced record debt burdens and when
their traditionally high bond ratings had slowly slipped. The
Commission called for imposition of a statewide annual dollar
cap on capital projects, so that all requests for financing could
be judged in the context of a limited pool of financing. This
potentially explosive feature was left until 1992 to develop and
will be controversial because hospitals will be forced to compete for limited opportunity to rebuild or expand. Another
Commission recommendation, allocation of capital expenditures in an all-inclusive DRG rate, is unlikely to be implemented in the near term. Rather, New Jersey seems likely to
wait for the outcome of the federal government's latest
attempt to similarly modify the Medicare program.
A final controversial feature of the Commission's report
was the recommendation to "rebundle" reimbursement for
hospital-based specialists into hospital rates.8 2 Separate billing
for these services had originally been allowed to comply with
Medicare regulations, but it was clear that in the process incentives for cost control had been lost. 3 The Commission bravely
82. CARE, supra note 57, at 26.
83. Id.
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proposed folding payment for these specialists' services into
the DRG rate for non-Medicare patients to align the incentives
of physicians and hospitals toward reducing volume and intensity.84 This recommendation will likely generate fierce debate.
Hospitals are already balking at the prospect of being forced to
regulate their own specialists under a DRG rate instead of
allowing the specialists to bill separately. The involved physicians are preparing to fight any threats to their professional
autonomy. On balance, rebundling seems an unlikely prospect
for the short term. There will be only so many recommendations on which the physician community can be successfully
fought, and it appears that extending the health planning process to non-hospital settings is viewed as a higher priority by
Commission members.
The Commission's recommendations are as remarkable for
what they do not address as for what they do. Its report
focuses on a few key steps: extension of health planning to all
providers, measuring hospital performance against need, capping capital expenditures, and rebundling physicians. These
steps will face formidable political opposition, but they also
stand the best chance of addressing the underlying dynamics of
health care cost growth in the 1990s. The Commission did not
put as much emphasis on the mechanics of regulating hospital
rates.
One remarkable aspect of the Commission's recommendations, for example, was the absence of any real debate on
whether to maintain state regulation of hospital costs on the
basis of DRGs. Such an outcome is surprising, since the Commission began its deliberations amid speculation about the system's effectiveness and listened for weeks to a drumbeat of
complaints about the DRG system's complexity and confusion.
In the end, however, this underlying foundation of rate setting
in New Jersey, developed over a decade ago, was left undisturbed.85 Cost control through rate regulation, no matter its
faults, was a necessary price to be paid. Insurers and business
agreed to finance uncompensated care because they were
assured of some measure of fiscal restraint. Hospitals agreed
to rate regulation because they were assured of payment for
uncompensated care and, some argued, sheltered from
competition.
84. Id.
85. See generally id. at 23-26.
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The Commission also made a number of relatively technical and less critical recommendations for refinements in hospital reimbursement that are sure to generate the expected
distributional fights in the months to come. Two notable
refinements were recommendations on how to make reimbursement for overhead costs more sensitive to the types of
cases a hospital treats and how to institute a payment adjustment that better recognizes the severity of illness of the
patients a hospital treats. As before, these technical refinements are unlikely to be central to the program's future. Also,
the Commission recommended simplifying the reimbursement
system by abolishing most rate appeals and retrospective rate
adjustments in favor of an annual two percent prospective
operating adjustment meant to compensate hospitals for most
unexpected cost increases." This would allow rates to be set
only once annually. This annual rate adjustment, coupled with
an expedited voluntary settlement process to clear out the
backlog of past years' appeals, would put New Jersey's system
back on a prospective basis where rates are set in advance.
These reforms are largely in place for 1991, but real questions
remain about how hospitals will respond to a system that
forces them to turn inward and examine their own management instead of turning to the regulators for relief. This is not
the first time a backlogged New Jersey rate setting system has
been cleaned up. If history is any guide, retrospectivity will
creep back into the system. Already the Hospital Rate Setting
Commission has made exceptions allowing special mid-year
rate adjustments for hospitals it deems to be in financial distress."7 It is also unclear how state regulators will behave the
first time a needed hospital in fiscal distress requires a retrospective rate adjustment.
Unfortunately, other key questions about the future of
controlling hospital costs were also left unanswered by the
Commission. New Jersey will continue to set DRG rates on
the basis of hospitals' average historical costs. Even with the
new practice of measuring financial performance against
benchmarks, there still will be no economic understanding of
the true costs of efficiently provided hospital services. Nor is it
clear how the hospital rate setting system in New Jersey is to
respond to conflicting pressures. Should one goal of the sys86. Id at 24.
87. New Jersey Hospital Rate Setting Commission, meeting of January 18, 1991.
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tem be to stabilize urban institutions on the front lines of society's wars on drugs, AIDS and crime? Should unlimited
reimbursement be available for new technologies that increase
costs, and should the system assume the aggressive adoption of
cost-saving technology? Should the reimbursement system
respond to the changing face of health care by, for example,
reforming payment for outpatient service to reflect the many
settings in which these services can or should be performed?
If the Commission's ambitious agenda for controlling
health care costs in the 1990s succeeds, the benefits for payers
are clear. However, it is less certain how hospitals will be
affected. As the hospital rate setting system entered the 1990s,
it also became clear that the challenges facing New Jersey hospitals were different from those of five years earlier. With various rate setting refinements and a prospective operating
adjustment in place, hospitals rarely faced financial crises
because of an underlying shortfall in revenue. As noted earlier, the DRG system did lead to improved solvency through its
guarantee of uncompensated care.' Regulators were typically
called upon to solve the problems of hospitals facing cash flow
crises, even where the revenue picture for the year was solid.
Hospitals argued that this was proper because working capital
sources had dried up as a result of tighter standards in the
banking industry and their own highly leveraged positions. In
the past, state regulators had responded to these cash crises
with such temporary rate adjustments that involved relatively
little scrutiny of underlying hospital management practices, on
the theory that it was more important to regulate revenue and
that temporary adjustments were "just cash flow." It is now
apparent, however, that this behavior let hospitals with serious
management deficiencies postpone real solutions. It remains to
be seen whether regulators will continue to respond to cash
crises in the same manner as they have in the past or whether
the price of temporary cash relief will be closer scrutiny of
hospital financial and management practices. So far, the limits
of a rate setting process applied to politically powerful institutions with well defined constituencies have been all too apparent. Rate setting has generally changed to suit hospital
behavior, not vice versa. If state regulators have the will to do
so, they can assure that hospitals seeking financial stability
understand there is a price to pay: structural change (integra88. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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tion with community-based services, for example), scrutiny of
foundations and related businesses, and review of management
practices. No Commission recommendation can substitute for
the political will and leadership necessary to carry out this
vision.
VIII.

EROSION OF THE ALL-PAYER SYSTEM

Cost control was one focus of the Commission's efforts, but
it is clear that the future of New Jersey's rate setting system
also rests on the stability of the payer market. Earlier, we outlined the ambitious plans of the Governor's Commission to
restructure Blue Cross and create a public purpose entity that
would offer insurance to the currently uninsured. 9 This recommendation is meant to stabilize Blue Cross and improve
access to health insurance, but it leaves other important issues
unresolved.
Perhaps the biggest threat to health care cost regulation in
New Jersey is that, since 1988, Medicare has compensated hospitals by using Medicare's own (generally lower) DRG rates for
Medicare patients and has not shared in the cost of uncompensated care.' While New Jersey is not the only state where
regulators oversee only a portion (roughly 60 percent) of hospital revenue, it is unique in asking non-Medicare payers to
make up 100 percent of any shortfalls between hospital revenue as paid by Medicare and what the state's DRG system
finds reasonable. This shortfall had grown to an estimated 369
million dollars for 1991, reflecting the growing gap between
Medicare rates, which have been held down by federal budget
pressures, and New Jersey's system with its new prospective
rate adjustments. In addition, other payers are paying an estimated 360 million dollars in uncompensated care not paid for
by Medicare.9 1

Blue Cross and other payers are increasingly

vocal in questioning whether the DRG system's guarantee of
full reimbursement for Medicare patients has given hospitals
an adequate incentive to maximize Medicare revenue. There
are anecdotal accounts of hospitals failing to bill Medicare
promptly or fully because of the certainty that other payers
will make up the difference, but it is unclear to regulators how
to enforce the current requirement that hospitals maximize
89. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see CARE, supra note 57, at 33-34.
90. See CARE, supra note 57, at 4-5.
91. New Jersey Department of Health estimate, 1990.
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Medicare revenue before charging the shortfall to other payers. Beyond this, real questions exist regarding the appropriateness of asking other payers to pick up 100 percent of the
Medicare shortfall. The question before the Governor's Commission was whether New Jersey hospitals would adopt some
of the more dramatic cost saving strategies used in other states
were they not insulated from the effect of Medicare cuts and
whether this would be desirable.
The Governor's Commission addressed the Medicare
shortfall problem by recommending that hospitals be reimbursed for only a percentage of the shortfall.9 2 A partial reimbursement will certainly redistribute some of the risk to
hospitals and possibly patients, rather than asking payers to
carry the load alone. This recommendation, however, does not
radically change hospital incentives to maximize Medicare revenue but simply changes the marginal price faced by a hospital
in deciding how much effort to put into Medicare maximization. The fact remains that what is a relatively invisible cost
shift in other states is made very visible, and very political, by
New Jersey's rate setting system.
Medicaid's participation in New Jersey's rate setting system has been called into question as well. Medicaid was one of
the first payers brought under the state's rate setting authority;9" now, it could be one of the first to leave. As in most
states, the Medicaid program is one of the largest and most visible budget items. Decisionmakers must balance the advantages to Medicaid of participating in a rate setting system
against the possibility that the program could strike a better
deal, at least in the short run, by independently negotiating
with the hospitals. Medicaid is also affected by federal requirements which can, in some circumstances, limit Medicaid payments to what Medicare would pay. In the end, it is quite
possible that the problems of maintaining the cooperation of
Medicare and Medicaid in New Jersey's system will end up in
the laps of the state's representatives in Washington, D.C.
The New Jersey all-payer system has either begun to
unravel or has unravelled completely, depending on one's point
of view. Whatever interpretation one adopts, the collapse of
the all-payer coalition has clear implications for the uncompensated care solution which had been predicated on the concept
92. See CARE, supra note 57, at 25-26.
93. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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(some say principle) of payer equity. There are those who
argue that an all-payer system is unnecessary. In other states,
after all, hospitals have made fundamental management
changes in response to Medicare's prospective payment system
94
with no regulation at all of costs for non-Medicare patients.
It could certainly be argued that aspects of rate regulation in
New Jersey insulated hospitals from the need to make these
changes, rather than promoting reform. On the other hand,
there are those who argue with good theoretical support that a
multiple-payer market will never be an effective negotiator
against the relatively unified interests of the hospital industry. 5 In this view, hospitals will always shift costs to the least
vocal or otherwise effective payer unless a single entity represents the interests of all payers. As noted earlier, an all-payer
system may be a prerequisite to the equitable sharing of large
uncompensated care and Medicare shortfalls. If this is true, it
may mean yet another round of restructuring in the future to
preserve the all-payer system.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The Governor's Commission on Health Care Costs and all
parties with an interest in health care in New Jersey continue
to grapple with many of the same fundamental issues: access
to health insurance, the effectiveness of different strategies for
health care cost control, the appropriate role and shape of government regulation, and the balance of interests among various
payers. These are the same problems that are being addressed
nationally. But New Jersey's responses, through a Trust Fund,
DRG payment, and now perhaps a payroll tax and "pay-orplay" mechanism for financing the care of the uninsured, has
been emulated by few other states. A unique set of conditions,
including a long history of regulation, activist governors, and a
specific federal interest in a cost-control experiment, allowed
this system to survive. The environment has now changed,
however. The all-payer system, based on Medicare participation, is gone. The cost of caring for the uninsured has become
visible through its growth and the mechanism put in place for
94. See, e.g., Sloan, Morrissey, & Valvona, Effects of the Medicare Prospective
Payment System on Hospital Cost Containment An Early Appraisal,66 THE MILBANK
QUARTERLY 220 (1988).

95. See, e.g., Himmelstein, & Woolhandler, A National Health Program for the
United States: A Physicians'Proposal,320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 102 (1989).
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its payment. The loss of federal participation in the experiment, coupled with the burgeoning cost of caring for the uninsured, has created real strains on the system as it enters the
21st century. Indeed, these strains may well lead to the system's demise.

